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Criminal Procedure: United States v. Holt: The Exception to the Exception That Swallows the Rule*
L Introduction
In United States v. Holt,' the en banc Tenth Circuit reversed its earlier
panel decision, holding that it is not unreasonable within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment for a police officer to ask a vehicle's occupants
questions regarding the presence of loaded weapons during a routine traffic
stop.2 Indeed, the officer may ask these questions without reasonable
suspicion or probable cause.' The court found the questions to be justified
on the grounds of officer safety." The Tenth Circuit's decision represents
an unwarranted and dangerous intrusion upon the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights of citizens traveling on the nation's roadways. It
removes important restrictions on police conduct pertaining to the scope of
the seizures and the need for reasonable suspicion. By removing those
requirements, the court effectively circumvented the Terry doctrine, which
operates as the exception to the general rule that only probable cause
justifies a police search or seizure.' In side-stepping the reasonablesuspicion exception to the probable-cause rule, the Tenth Circuit has
cleared the way for law enforcement personnel to conduct suspicionless
criminal investigations, searches, and seizures.
Part II of this note examines selected cases that gave rise to the
principles governing traffic stops under the Fourth Amendment. It also
analyzes the roles played by probable cause and reasonable suspicion
during a routine traffic stop. Through illustration, Part II demonstrates how
complex an ordinary traffic stop can become. It also shows the difficulty
courts sometimes have keeping the distinct concepts in clear focus. Part III
examines the Holt case itself and exposes the badly splintered majority's
rationale. Part III also explores the dissent's reasoning. Interestingly, the
Holt court specifically adopted a portion of the dissenting opinion as part
of the majority pronouncement. Part IV provides an analysis of Holt.
Subpart A demonstrates that the majority's logic and rationale were
*

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

This note received the 2001-2002 Harry Alley-Leroy Allen Prize for Best Case Note.
264 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam).
Id. at 1217-18.
Id. at 1217.
Id. at 1218.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968).
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seriously flawed. Subpart B explores the manifold problems Holt creates
with regard to the Fourth Amendment and the Terry doctrine. Subpart C
shows how the Holt court's decision implicates the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination. It also demonstrates the difference between Holt
and Berkemer v. McCarty,' an important case dealing with selfincrimination and traffic stops.
!!. The Current State of Confusion
A. History and Principle
In Miranda v. Arizona," the U.S. Supreme Court held that whenever
police subject a person to custodial interrogation, they must inform the
person of certain rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.' The court
stated that if the police fail in this obligation, any inculpatory statements
made will be inadmissible as evidence in a criminal trial9 unless the
government can meet the heavy burden of proving a knowing, intelligent
waiver of constitutional rights."' The court specified that this requirement
applies only in the case of custodial interrogation by the police." Custodial interrogation is any "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way."'" The Court enacted
those procedural safeguards to deter the practice of incommunicado
interrogation in a police-dominated atmosphere. 3
The Court decided Terry v. Ohio"' two years later. The Terry Court
created an exception to the long-standing rule that only probable cause
justifies the search and seizure of a person. The Terry Court held that if
an officer has a reasonable suspicion that a person with whom she is
dealing at close range is armed and dangerous, she may conduct a patdown search of the individual's outer clothing to search for weapons.'

6. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
7. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

8. Id. at 479.
9. Id. at 476.
10. Id. at 475.

11. Id. at 444; see also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980) (concluding that
Miranda safeguards come into play whenever police subject a person in custody to
interrogation or its functional equivalent).
12. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
13. Id. at 456.

14. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

15. Id.at 24.
16. Id.
at 30.
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The basis for the search is "reasonable suspicion": "whether a reasonably
prudent [person] in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that
[her] safety or that of others was in danger."' 7 The officer's reasonable
suspicion must arise from specific facts, along with the reasonable
inferences drawn from them, which she can articulate."' General suspicion
or a hunch will not suffice.' 9 The Court stated that a Terry search is
reasonable if the officer's action was (1) "justified at its inception" and (2)
"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place..."
Some years later, in United States v. Sharpe,' the Supreme Court held
that the second requirement in the Terry analysis - the "scope" requirement - is actually a scope and duration requirement.22 The Court
declined to impose a strict time limit on Terry investigations. "3 Instead, it
held that the proper inquiry is "whether the police diligently pursued a
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions
quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant."24
One must bear in mind that there are two distinct streams of reasonable
suspicion that may be present in a Terry encounter. The first stream is that
criminal activity is actually afoot or about to be.2 That type of reasonable
suspicion authorizes the officer to detain a person for questioning designed
to confirm or dispel the officer's suspicions." The other stream is that the
detained individual is presently armed and dangerous, which provides the
officer with authority to conduct a limited "frisk" for weapons.2 7 These
two types of reasonable suspicion are not interchangeable, although the
suspicion that a person is involved in criminal activity might contribute to
a reasonable suspicion that the person is also armed.2"
17. Id. at 27.
18. Id. In requiring specific facts, the Court stated that the "demand for specificity in
the information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." Id. at 21 n.18.
19. Id. at 27.
20. Id. at 20.
21. 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
22. Id. at 685.
23. Id. at 686.
24. Id.
25. United States v. Swift, 220 F.3d 502, 506 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Brown,
188 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Caicedo, 85 F.3d 1184, 1189 (6th Cir.
1996); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
26. Swift, 220 F.3d at 506; Brown, 188 F.3d at 864; Caicedo, 85 F.3d at 1189.
27. United States v. Johnson, 170 F.3d 708, 713 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Jaramillo, 25 F.3d 1146, 1151 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Roach, 958 F.2d 679, 682 (6th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Alvarez, 899 F.2d 833, 839 (9th Cir. 1990).
28. See United States v. Christmas, 222 F.3d 141, 143 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v.
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The Supreme Court addressed both the Miranda and Terry doctrines in
Berkemer v. McCarty. 9 Berkemer involved a DUI traffic stop in which an
officer, without first reading the Miranda warnings, questioned a motorist
about using intoxicants." After the motorist admitted to the use of various
substances, the officer arrested him."
The Berkemer Court held that police must give Miranda warnings any
time they arrest and take a person into custody, regardless of the "nature
or severity" of the crime charged. 2 The Court found that a traffic stop is
"more analogous" to a Terry stop than to a custodial arrest.3 An officer
must, therefore, limit his actions in scope and duration to the circumstances
that justified the stop in the first place.' Under Berkemer, a person
stopped by the police during a traffic stop, although not free to leave, is not
"in custody" as envisioned by Miranda.5 A motorist is hence not
subjected to custodial interrogation during a traffic stop, so no Miranda
warnings are required for questioning related to that event.' But if the
motorist is arrested, the Miranda warnings are required before police may
subject him to custodial interrogation. 7
In Whren v. United States,38 the Supreme Court held that an officer's
decision to stop a vehicle is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when
the officer has "probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has
occurred."39 The Court stated that an officer's subjective intentions in
pulling over a motorist are irrelevant to a Fourth Amendment analysis so
long as the traffic stop itself is justified.' Under Whren, it is perfectly

Smart, 98 F.3d 1379, 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. Barnes, 910 F.2d 1342, 134344 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Laing, 889 F.2d 281, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1989). But see
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979) (holding that where there is not reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity or that the suspect is armed, officers may not stop the person
for investigation nor conduct a frisk; nothing in Terry authorizes a general "cursory search
for weapons").
29. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
30. Id. at 423.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 434.
33. Id. at 439.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 440.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 434. For the present discussion, it is important to remember that the officer's
questions in Berkemer related to the reason the motorist was stopped - driving under the
influence - and not some other offense.
38. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
39. Id. at 810.
40. d. at 813.
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acceptable for an officer to use the proverbial broken taillight to pull over
a car when his actual intention is to investigate some other crime.
The Court, in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,"' struck down a scheme
of drug interdiction checkpoints. Unlike other checkpoints based on some
aspect of roadway safety, which have won approval from the Supreme
Court," the checkpoints in Edmond were only for the purpose of interdicting illegal drugs."3 The Court found that the checkpoints only served to
further the government's general interest in crime control." According to
the Court, such roadblocks are unconstitutional because they are based on
unparticularized suspicion and bestow "'standardless and unconstrained
discretion"' on police officers at the checkpoints."5 The Edmond case is
relevant because (1)Holt involved the use of a roadway checkpoint that
arguably was not based on highway safety concerns and (2) the Supreme
Court decided Edmond at the same time Holt was pending before the Tenth
Circuit.
B. Into the Abyss: Today's FourthAmendment and the Traffic Stop
1.What Exactly Is a Traffic Stop?
The exact constitutional dimensions of a traffic stop remain undefined.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a routine traffic stop more closely
resembles a Terry-style investigatory stop than a custodial arrest."
Another view is that a traffic stop based on probable cause is actually a
noncustodial arrest - a concept the Supreme Court has completely
avoided, but which has some merit."' At a minimum, the Court has held
41. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
42. See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (upholding
sobriety checkpoints at fixed locations in the interest of highway safety); Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (suggesting that a brief, suspicionless stop at a fixed checkpoint
to ensure satisfaction of licensing and registration requirements would be constitutional in
the interest of highway safety).
43. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40-41.
44. Id. at 41-42.
45. Id. at 39 (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661).
46. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1051 (1983); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
878 (1975).

47. That viewpoint maintains that routine traffic stops, based on an observed traffic
violation, are actually arrests that do not result in the offender being taken into custody. Such
a situation would result in a fourth category of police-citizen contact in addition to
consensual encounters, investigatory stops, and custodial arrests. See David A. Moran, Traffic
Stops, Littering Tickets, and Police Warnings: The Case for a Fourth Amendment Non.
Custodial Arrest Doctrine, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1143 (2000); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1,26 (1968) ("An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution."); United States
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that a traffic stop is "'a "seizure" within the meaning of [the Fourth]
Amendmen[t].'"
The law appears to recognize two grounds upon which a police officer
may use her official authority to stop a motorist on the road. The first
ground - probable cause - exists when the officer reasonably believes
that the particular motorist is violating a traffic law. 9 Once an officer has
probable cause to believe that a motorist's conduct falls outside the law's
accepted bounds, she may pull the motorist off the road and investigate the
infraction, if any investigation is necessary ." The officer may ask
questions related to the stop and run certain computer checks to ensure that
the driver is legally entitled to operate the car and has satisfied the
administrative registration requirements." Based on the officer's probable
cause, she may arrest the driver for the infraction, 2 issue a citation
containing a promise to appear in court on a later date,3 or release the
motorist with a warning.
Second, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity can justify an officer
pulling over a motorist. 4 This is the Terry doctrine on wheels.
Reasonable suspicion exists when it is based on specific facts, along with
the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, which the officer

v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d 643, 648 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that a traffic stop
is "a form of arrest").
48. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 436-37 (alterations in original) (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at
653); accord Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 (1996).
49. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001); Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.
50. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810; $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d at 646-47. But cf

United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that where there
is no probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the officer has no right to detain the motorist
or investigate the supposed violation).
51. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d at 647.
52. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354.

53. United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1349 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 979 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1554
(1Oth Cir. 1993); see also Tanner v. Heise, 879 F.2d 572, 579 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that,
under Idaho law, when an officer has "reasonable and probable grounds" to disbelieve that
the motorist will honor the written promise to appear in court, he may arrest the motorist and
take him before a magistrate).
54. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (holding that without reasonable
suspicion of a violation, a police officer's action in stopping a vehicle violates the Fourth
Amendment); United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir. 1999) (explaining that
a traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if it is supported by "a reasonable
articulable suspicion" that the motorist has violated a traffic or equipment regulation);
$405,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d at 646 (stating that when police lack probable cause
to make a traffic stop, "a purely investigative stop must be based upon at least.., reasonable
suspicion").
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can articulate to someone else." It may not be based on unparticularized
suspicion, gut feeling, or hunch." The reasonable suspicion must exist
before the officer decides to stop the vehicle, and the officer must limit the
ensuing investigation according to the suspicion that justified it." The
officer cannot conduct a general investigation to determine if any crime has
been committed.
2. Conducting the Traffic Stop: Things Always Seem to Pop Up
If during the course of the Terry investigation, the officer develops a
reasonable suspicion that the person with whom she is dealing is armed and
dangerous, she may take certain actions to protect her safety and that of
others at the scene.59 With such a suspicion, the officer may perform a
"Terry frisk" of the driver and any or all of the passengers." The officer
may also "frisk" the vehicle's passenger compartment.' The Supreme
Court has held that without reasonable suspicion the officer may
nonetheless order the driver and/or passengers to get out of the car. 2
Other measures allowed without reasonable suspicion are ordering the
driver and/or passengers to remain in the car 3 or ordering them to raise
their hands." The officer may shine her flashlight into the dark passenger
compartment of the vehicle for her own safety"5 and may, if the vehicle
has darkly tinted windows, open a door to determine if there is any
danger."
A probable-cause event and a Terry investigation often occur simultaneously during a traffic stop. One of the most perplexing difficulties in
dealing with Fourth Amendment issues in the traffic-stop context is the
Supreme Court's continuing refusal to clearly delineate the bounds of each
55. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); see also Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663; Ozbirn,
189 F.3d at 1198; Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d at 1348; United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783,
787 (10th Cir. 1995).
56. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
57. Id. at 20.
58. Id. at 30 (holding that the officer's frisk was valid, in part, because it was limited
and not "a general exploratory search for whatever evidence of criminal activity he might
find").
59. Id. at 27.
60. Id.
61. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983).
62. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.
106, 111 (1977).
63. Rogala v. District of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
64. United States v. Moorefield, Ill F.3d 10, 13 (3d Cir. 1997).
65. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983) (plurality opinion).
66. United States v. Stanfield, 109 F.3d 976, 981 (4th Cir. 1997).
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event. Instead, the Court relies on its statement that a traffic stop is "more
analogous" to a Terry encounter than to a custodial arrest." But the mere
fact that a traffic stop is analogous to a Terry encounter does not necessarily mean that it is such an encounter. By blurring the lines between a
probable-cause event and a Terry investigation, the Court also blurs the
boundaries of acceptable police conduct.
A probable-cause traffic stop is essentially a course of action by the
police in response to an observed traffic violation."S A Terry encounter,
on the other hand, is an investigative procedure based on reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. 9 The entire point of a Terry encounter
(from the police officer's perspective) is to find something that will
generate probable cause, justifying an arrest. ' " One type of stop is
reactive, the other is proactive. One is based on probable cause, the other
on reasonable suspicion. The events are mutually exclusive. The probable
cause of the traffic offense may not, under Terry principles, also serve as
the reasonable suspicion of an investigative detention for some other
offense."'
For the run-of-the-mill speeding ticket, no real investigation is necessary
because speeding is, for the most part, a strict liability offense." Once the

67. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,
439 (1984).
68. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001); Whren v. United States,

517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996).
69. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226 (1985); United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
70. In Holt, the trooper testified that his purpose in searching for the weapon was to
discover a violation so he could arrest Holt. United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1232 (10th
Cir. 2001) (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
71. Reasonable suspicion can grow to become probable cause when the officer's
investigations confirm her suspicions. See United States v. Brown, 188 F.3d 860, 866 (7th
Cir. 1999) (ruling that the suspect's behavior and other factors during a valid speeding stop
gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the suspect was armed; reasonable suspicion gave
way to probable cause when officer found no weapons but drugs); United States v. Allegree,
175 F.3d 648, 650-51 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that vehicle occupants' behavior during valid
traffic stop gave rise to reasonable suspicion of narcotics possession that, in turn, gave rise
to probable cause after investigation); United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1350 (10th
Cir. 1998) (holding that evidence obtained during officer's investigative detention gave rise
to probable cause to believe that motorist was in possession of narcotics, justifying more
intrusive search of vehicle). These courts, however, did not allow officers to use the probable
cause of the traffic stop to infer that the person was armed or in possession of illegal
narcotics in any of these cases.
72. See generally Stanley v. Turner, 6 F.3d 399, 404 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding no
culpable mental state required for involuntary (vehicular) manslaughter; the only mental state
required was that of the underlying traffic offense; and violation of a traffic offense held
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officer has evidence that the motorist was speeding, the infraction is
complete without evidence of the defendant's intent. Offenses that fall
within this category usually pertain to a specific instance of conduct, such
as speeding, failure to use a turn signal, or defective taillight. The naked
fact of the offense is all the evidence the officer needs, and no investigation
is necessary to confirm the prohibited act.
Offenses speaking more to the condition of the driver, which are based
on the overall quality of the person's driving rather than to any specific
event, are more problematic and generally require investigation on the side
of the road. It seems obvious that driving under the influence (DUI)
generally cannot be proved without some interaction with the driver."
DUI stops are a common and illustrative example of an automobile Terry
stop because a police officer generally will not have probable cause to
arrest a driver for DUI until she observes that person's behavior.
3. Explanation Through Illustration
To set these principles in motion, assume that an officer pulls over a car.
The officer stopped the car because of a generally recognizable pattern of
driving, weaving in the lane, erratic speed changes, and unreasonably slow
speed, which aroused her suspicion that the driver might be intoxicated. If
the driving included no illegal acts, the stop is presumably based on a
reasonable suspicion that the motorist is driving under the influence." If
the motorist committed a traffic offense in the officer's presence as part of
his erratic driving, such as failure to signal, then the officer has probable
cause based on the observed traffic violation to pull over the car." The
officer may simultaneously have a reasonable suspicion that the driver is
intoxicated.

negligence per se); United States v. McMillan, 820 F.2d 251, 258 (8th Cir. 1987) (discussing
that, under South Dakota law, driving with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the
statutory limit is a strict liability offense).
73. See generally United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 978 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding
that probable cause did not exist where officer arrested driver for DUI with no investigation
or meaningful observation of driver's behavior); Pecsenye v. Village of Park Forest, No. 94C-5536, 1997 WL 102534, at * 1, 3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1997) (deciding that officer who had
observed two traffic violations had probable cause to arrest the driver for DUI based on
driver's behavior and responses to questions, which included roadside demonstration of
gymnastics); Mason v. Stock, 955 F. Supp. 1293, 1304 (D. Kan. 1997) (finding that officer
had probable cause to arrest driver based on observed driving, admission that he had been
drinking, and observed behavior).
74. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (defining reasonable suspicion as "specific reasonable
inferences which [the officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of experience").
75. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996).
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As previously explained, no real investigation is required for the failureto-signal charge. Based on probable cause, the officer can ticket the driver
for that infraction regardless of anything else that happens." The
reasonable suspicion that the driver is intoxicated is what enables the
officer to investigate whether or not that is true." The officer may take
reasonable steps to confirm or dispel her suspicion concerning the driver."8
These measures may include observing that person's behavior, asking
questions regarding where he has been and whether he has been drinking,
and conducting roadside sobriety tests."9 After a reasonable time, the
officer must decide whether her investigation has produced probable cause
to believe that the person was operating the car under the influence." If
the answer is yes, the officer may arrest the driver.' If the answer is no,
the officer must allow the driver to continue on his way without further
interference - other than a ticket for failing to signal."
The two processes are separate. The officer may not import the probable
cause of failure-to-signal as the reasonable suspicion of DUI without more.
There must be something specific, which the officer can articulate as more
than gut feeling or hunch, that makes the officer suspect that the driver is
intoxicated."' Only then can the officer shift her focus from the probablecause offense to the reasonable-suspicion investigation.
An officer may develop a reasonable suspicion about more than one
thing during an encounter with a motorist. Assume that during the
investigation into whether the driver is drunk, the officer detects the smell
of marijuana smoke coming from inside the car. That creates an entirely
new reasonable suspicion that there might be drugs in the car.' But again,
76. If the state statutes categorize traffic violations as criminal offenses, the officer may
also arrest the motorist based on the same probable cause that justified stopping the person
for the purpose of writing a ticket. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
77. United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1176 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1349 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1554
(10th Cir. 1993).
78. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975).
79. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v, Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1988); Berkemer v. McCarty,
468 U.S. 420, 423 (1984); Mason v. Stock, 955 F. Supp. 1293, 1304 (D. Kan. 1997).
80. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686; United States v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d
643, 647-48 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir. 1999).
81. See, e.g., Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 423; Ozbirn, 189 F.3d at 1200; United States v.
Worthington, 544 F.2d 1275, 1280 (5th Cir. 1977).
82. West, 219 F.3d at 1176; $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d at 648; Ozbirn, 189
F.3d at 1199.
83. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 188 F.3d 860, 865 (7th Cir. 1999); Ozbirn, 189
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the two Terry investigations are separate and distinct. The officer could not
claim that the reasonable suspicion that the driver was drunk justified the
suspicion that there were drugs in the car without something specific
like the smell of marijuana smoke wafting from. an open window.
This hypothetical illustrates just how complex a routine traffic stop can
become. It also shows how easy it can be to lose sight of exactly which
justification allowed the police to expand the investigation from a simple
traffic infraction to something more serious. To maintain fealty to the Terry
doctrine and the Fourth Amendment in the traffic-stop context, it is
imperative that courts keep probable cause separate from reasonable
suspicion and the different types of reasonable suspicion separate from each
other. The consequences of failing to do so appear in decisions in which
courts jumble the doctrines with confusing results.
4. Two Examples of JudicialMix-and-Match
5 the Tenth Circuit held that the sole
In United States v. Botero-Ospina,"
inquiry in determining the reasonableness of a traffic stop is whether the
officer had reasonable suspicion that a particular motorist violated a traffic
regulation." The court stated that if the officer's initial traffic stop, though
justified by the officer's observation of a traffic infraction, is motivated by
a desire to engage in a more serious criminal investigation, his inquiry is
circumscribed by the Terry scope requirement."' The problem with such
a holding is that reasonable suspicion cannot be the only determination of
reasonableness in pulling over a car on the highway." Many traffic
violations are by their very nature proved by probable cause or nothing.
Speeding is an example. An officer either observes the driver speeding or
she does not. Once the driver pulls the car off the road, all the investigation in the world (short of a confession) will not prove that the driver
was speeding on the road. The court's statement also erroneously implies
that the reasonable suspicion of the initial traffic offense can be sufficient
for any other inquiry that might arise during the stop.

F.3d at 1200; United States v. Corral, 823 F.2d 1389, 1393 (10th Cir. 1987).
85. 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995).
86. Id. at 787.
87. Id. at 788.
88. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (stating that the decision to
stop a vehicle is reasonable when based on probable cause); United States v. ZubiaMelendez, 263 F.3d 1155, 1160 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345,
1348 (10th Cir. 1998).
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United States v. Hill9 is another example of a court confusing these
principles. In. Hill, the Sixth Circuit stated that reasonable police conduct
requires that "any subsequent detention after the initial stop must not be
excessively intrusive in that the officer's actions must be reasonably related
in scope to circumstances justifying the initial interference."'" The Hill
court uses words from the Terry decision to thwart its purpose by tying the
subsequent investigative detention to the initial justification for the traffic
stop." A Terry investigation is not parasitic. It must stand on its own
basis of reasonable suspicion and may not borrow the probable cause or
reasonable suspicion of some other offense as carte blanche for any other
suspicion that may arise.92
!!!. United States v. Holt
A. Case Facts and ProceduralHistory
The police in Muldrow, Oklahoma, believed that Holt was transporting
illegal drugs. 3 Acting on that belief, several Muldrow officers and an
Oklahoma Highway Patrol trooper set up a roadblock on the road to Holt's
house." The officers stopped every car and checked every driver's
license."5 As Holt approached, the trooper observed that he was not

89. 195 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 1999).
90. id. at 264.
91. Even if the initial traffic offense is a factor in determining reasonable suspicion, an
officer cannot automatically use it as reasonable suspicion. An officer's action in a Terry
encounter must be "justified at its inception, and . .. reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I,
20 (1968).
92. Id. at 21.
93. United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 2001).
94. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court decided City of Indianapolisv. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32
(2000), after the district court in Holt rendered its judgment and during the pendency of the
appeal. Edmond held that traffic checkpoints established only for the purpose of interdicting
illegal drugs are unconstitutional because the purpose of such checkpoints is not distinguishable from the government's general crime-control interest. Id. at 48. Narcotics
checkpoints subject innocent citizens to the "'standardless and unconstrained discretion.' of
the officers at the roadblock, id.at 39 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661
(1979)), who investigate crime with no individualized suspicion or probable cause, id. at 43.
The Holt court left the parties free to develop the factual record and address Edmond on
remand. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1218 n.2. The parties, thus, did not present the illegal roadblock

issue to the Tenth Circuit.
95. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1218.
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wearing his seatbelt." The trooper told Holt to pull off the road and to sit
in the front seat of his patrol car."'
The trooper took Holt's driver's license and was writing a warning for the
seatbelt violation when he asked if there was anything in Holt's truck that
he should know about, such as a loaded weapon." Holt admitted to the
presence of a loaded gun in the truck. 9 Holt did not claim that he had a
permit to carry a concealed weapon, and the trooper did not ask.""' The
trooper then asked if there was anything else in the truck he should know
about."" In response, "Holt stated, 'I know what you are referring to' but
'I don't use them anymore.' """ After further questioning, the trooper asked
for and received Holt's consent to search the truck."" The trooper found
the loaded gun, and the Muldrow officers found drugs and drug paraphernalia."'
The officers arrested Holt, who was subsequently indicted in federal
court on drug and firearm charges. The district court granted his pretrial
motion to suppress the statements to the trooper and the evidence found in
the truck."' The United States then brought an interlocutory appeal to the
Tenth Circuit. The issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether the trooper's
questions regarding the existence of a loaded gun in the vehicle, without
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, were reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment."*
B. The (Barely) Majority Reasoning
To say that the Tenth Circuit was split in its decision is an
understatement. The original panel produced a 2-1 decision affirming the
district court's grant of the motion to suppress." Judge Briscoe wrote the
panel opinion, and Judge Ebel dissented. On rehearing, the tables were
turned. Judge Ebel authored the en banc decision,"' which reversed the

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1219.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1217.
107. United States v. Holt, 229 F.3d 931, 936 (10th Cir. 2000), rev'd en banc, 264 F.3d
1215 (10th Cir. 2001).
108. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1215.
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panel. Three other judges joined that opinion."' Interestingly, the
majority opinion specifically adopted portions of Judge Briscoe's dissenting
opinion"" and Judge Henry's concurrence."'
The court rejected Holt's contention that the trooper's question concerning
loaded weapons in the truck was impermissible even though it admittedly
was not founded on reasonable suspicion or probable cause.' 2 The court
examined the requirement of the Oklahoma Self-Defense Act"' that all
persons who are in lawful possession of a concealed weapon reveal that
fact to the police when pulled over for a traffic stop."4 The court used
this provision to conclude that Oklahoma citizens who are lawfully carrying
a loaded weapon have no reasonable expectation of privacy in possessing
the gun because they must reveal that fact to a police officer."' Following that line of reasoning, the court further decided that because those
in lawful possession have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
weapon, then clearly those in unlawful possession also have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in possessing a gun.16
The Holt court followed established precedent that a traffic stop is a
"seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,' '7 and that the
reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment is a balance of
the government's interests versus those of the private citizen."' The court
stated that it generally disfavors bright-line tests in Fourth Amendment
analysis in favor of a totality-of-the-circumstances approach." 9 In such
a balancing test, no single factor is determinative; the court considers all
the objective facts to arrive at a decision.' The court also reiterated the
established Terry criteria for traffic stops. It said that the reasonableness of
such a search or seizure depends on whether the officer's actions were
justified at the outset and whether they were reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances that initially justified the intrusion.' 2'

109. Chief
at 1217 n.**.
110. Id. at
111. Id. at
112. Id. at

Judge Tacha and Judges Brorby and Kelly joined Judge Ebels opinion. Id.
1227 n.! (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
1217 n.**.
1226.

113. 21 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1290.1-1290.26 (2001).

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Holt, 264 F.3d at 1222.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1220.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The court then balanced its conclusion - that neither those Oklahomans
in lawful possession of a gun nor those in unlawful possession have a
reasonable expectation of privacy - against the "legitimate and weighty"
government interest in officer safety.' The court found that officer safety
wins in every case,' allowing the officer to take the minimally intrusive
step of simply asking the driver if there are weapons in the car. 4 The
court also held that its balancing test weighs in the government's favor even
when there is no particularized suspicion that the motorist is armed and
even when the officer does not subjectively fear the motorist.'"
The court made it clear that the motorist does not have to answer the
officer's question.' If the motorist chooses to answer, any statement can
be used just like any other voluntary admission in a traffic stop.'27 The
court noted that a refusal to answer, standing alone, may not serve as the
justification for a more intrusive search nor may the officer arrest the
motorist for refusing to answer.'
But the court's holding allows the
officer to take reasonable safety precautions based on a refusal to answer,
and the refusal may also "'alert the officer to the need for continued observation.""' The court observed that police are skilled at detecting overly
nervous or evasive responses, and so any answer - or no answer at all may prove valuable to the officer.'" Ultimately, the court held that once
the officer has asked the question, he may take no further action without
particularized reasonable suspicion.' 3'
C. The Dissent's Reasoning
The portion of the dissenting opinion adopted by the en banc pronouncement addresses the scope and duration limitations of a traffic stop and is
122. Id. at 1222.
123. Id. at 1226.
124. Id. at 1223.
125. Id. at 1226.
126. Id. at 1237 (Henry, J., concurring).

127. Id. at 1224. This flies in the face of existing Tenth Circuit precedent regarding the
voluntariness of an encounter between a citizen and the police. For example, an officer may
not lengthen the duration of the stop to engage in questioning beyond the purpose of the
initial stop unless the encounter is consensual or based on an "objectively reasonable
suspicion of illegal activity." United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1349 (10th Cir.
1998). So long as the officer retains the citizen's driver's license, the encounter is not
consensual and must be based on reasonable suspicion. Id. (citing United States v.
McKneely, 6 F.3d 1447, 1451 (10th Cir. 1993)).
128. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1224.
129. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring)).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1237 (Henry, J., concurring).
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based on Terry principles. The dissent, speaking for the court, specifically
rejected the position taken by the Fifth Circuit in United States v.
Shabazz,"' which the United States urged the court to adopt in Holt.'"
In Shabazz, the Fifth Circuit held that an officer's questioning, even on
a subject unrelated to the traffic stop's purpose, is not itself a Fourth
Amendment violation.' 3' The court stated that so long as the duration of
the officer's questioning on any topic does not exceed the duration of the
stop, the questioning is not intrusive." Shabazz relied heavily on the
U.S. Supreme Court's statement in Florida v. Bostick 3' that "mere police
questioning does not constitute a seizure.""' The Holt dissent distinguished the factual situation in Bostick from that in Holt. The issue in
Bostick was whether a seizure had taken place at all.' 38 In Holt, a seizure
plainly occurred. The Holt dissent was concerned that Shabazz removed the
"scope" prong of the Terry analysis and focused only on the "duration" part
of the equation.' The dissent argued that such a position runs counter
to Supreme Court jurisprudence, which imposes limitations not only on the
length of the detention but also on the manner in which it is conducted.'"
The dissent, speaking for only four judges, then took exception to the
majority's creation of another bright-line test in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, especially given the Supreme Court's stated dislike of such
analyses.'' The dissent observed that to accord with precedent, an officer
132. 993 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1993).
133. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1228 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
134. Shabazz, 993 F.2d at 436.
135. Id.; see also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 687 (1985) (focusing the
reasonableness inquiry of a traffic stop on the duration of the stop).
136. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
137. Id. at 434.
138. In Bostick, Florida sheriff deputies boarded a bus at a stop and randomly asked
passengers for consent to search luggage. Id. at 431. Despite the cramped confines of a bus
and the fact that Bostick might not have felt free to leave, the Court strongly implied,
without actually deciding, that the officers had not "seized" him for Fourth Amendment
purposes. Id. at 437. Thus, the encounter was consensual, and the officers' questioning
without reasonable suspicion or probable cause was not unreasonable. Id. at 434.
139. United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1229 (10th Cir. 2001) (Briscoe, J.,
dissenting).
140. Id. at 1230 (Briscoe, J., dissenting); see also Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 690 (Marshall,
J., concurring) ("Even a stop that lasts no longer than necessary to complete the investigation
for which the stop was made may amount to an illegal arrest if the stop is more than
'minimally intrusive."') (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 693, 703 (1983)); Florida
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) ("[Tlhe investigative methods employed [by the police]
should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's
suspicion in a short period of time.").
141. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1230-31 (Briscoe, J., dissenting); see Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S.
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must base a Terry encounter on reasonable suspicion, which, in turn, she
must base on specific, objective facts. 2 The dissent asserted that the
objective facts of Holt indicated absolutely no officer safety issue and no
reasonable suspicion that Holt might be armed. 3
IV. The Majority's Reasoning and Conclusion Are Flawed
A. Courts Cannot Use the Oklahoma Self-Defense Act as the Standard for
Expectations of Privacy in Oklahoma
The Holt court based its decision on an interpretation of the Oklahoma
Self-Defense Act (OSDA).'" By the court's reading, because of a provision
in the OSDA that applies to OSDA licensees, no one in the state of
Oklahoma has a reasonable expectation of privacy in possessing a concealed
weapon."5
The majority of Oklahoma statutory law pertaining to firearms is found
in title 21, chapter 53 of the Oklahoma Statutes. That chapter contains the
OSDA, the Oklahoma Firearms Act of 1971, and several general
prohibitions pertaining to the carrying of weapons of various types,
including handguns, as well as penalties for violations." These general
prohibitions - applicable to all Oklahoma citizens - also make illegal
other aspects of weapon possession, sale, and transfer. The Oklahoma
Firearms Act of 1971 "' establishes certain exceptions to the general
prohibition against carrying weapons that apply to all the state's citizens.
Included among its provisions are the definitions of various types of
firearms,'" conditions under which any citizen may carry a firearm,"'

33, 39 (1996) (stating that the Court has "consistently eschewed bright-line rules" in favor

of a totality-of-the-circumstances test based on objective facts in determining Fourth
Amendment reasonableness).
142. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1230 (Briscoe, J., dissenting); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 654 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96
(1964).

143. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1231 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
144. 21 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1290.1-1290.26 (2001).
145. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1222.
146. Chapter 53 iscomprised of sections 1271.1 through 1290.26. Among its provisions
is section 1272, which makes it "unlawful for any person to carry upon or about his or her

person, or in a purse or other container belonging to the person" various types of weapons,
including firearms, knives, certain types of clubs, metal knuckles, "or any other offensive

weapon, whether such weapon be concealed or unconcealed." 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1272
(2001). Violation of section 1272 is punishable as a misdemeanor. Id. § 1276.
147. Id.§§ 1289.1-1289.26.
148. Id.§§ 1289.3-1289.5.
149. Id.§ 1289.6.
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conditions under which any citizen may have a firearm in a vehicle, 151
restrictions on weapon modifications,' restrictions on the use of body
armor, 52 and restrictions on the possession or use of certain types of
ammunition.'"
The OSDA' 51 is a group of statutes held separate from the rest of the
statutory law pertaining to firearms. The OSDA does not apply to all
Oklahomans. The language of the statute itself and the organization of other
Oklahoma firearms statutes indicate that the OSDA is an exception to the
general law applicable to all citizens on the possession and use of firearms.
The OSDA functions to grant special privileges to certain qualified
Oklahomans. In exchange, licensees are bound by higher standards of
responsibility and accountability in the carrying and possession of concealed
handguns. The Oklahoma legislature took great pains to distinguish the body
of law that applies to the citizenry at large from that which applies only to
OSDA licensees. The following samples of Oklahoma statutes illustrate this
point.
Title 21, section 1290.8(B), is part of the OSDA. It requires all persons
who have a concealed-weapon license to have that permit plus another form
of state photo identification with them at all times when they are actually
carrying a concealed weapon. 55 This requirement applies only to OSDA
licensees and not to the general public. Criminal penalties and administrative sanctions apply if the licensee fails to meet the higher
requirements.56
In contrast, title 21, section 1289.7, is part of the Oklahoma Firearms Act
of 1971. It allows any Oklahoma citizen, other than a convicted felon, to
transport a rifle, shotgun, or pistol in a vehicle so long as the weapon is
unloaded and in plain view, in a firearms carrying case that is in plain view,
or in an exterior locked compartment, including the trunk." 7 Section

150. Id. §§ 1289.7, 1289.13.
151. Id. § 1289.18.
152. Id. § 1289.26.
153. Id. § 1289.21.
154. Id. §§ 1290.1-1290.26.
155. The statute requires that "[t]he [licensee] shall be required to have possession of
his or her valid handgun license and a valid Oklahoma driver license or an Oklahoma State
photo identification at all times when in possession of an authorized pistol." Id. § 1290.8(B).
156. Failure to comply with the requirements of section 1290.8(B) is punishable under
the general provision for the unlawful carrying of a weapon, section 1272. Id.
157. The terms of the statute provide:
Any person, except a convicted felon, may transport in a motor vehicle a rifle,
shotgun or pistol, open and unloaded, at any time. For purposes of this section
"open" means the firearm is transported in plain view, in a case designed for
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1289.7 also specifically addresses the situation in which a person who has
a concealed-weapon permit is riding in the same car with a person who does
not. If the licensee is carrying a concealed weapon or has concealed a
weapon in the car, the nonlicensee is not guilty of illegally possessing a
weapon so long as the licensee is either in the vehicle or nearby.' 8 Here
the legislature placed an OSDA-based exception into a provision of law
applicable to all Oklahomans.
Title 21, section 1289.9, makes it a crime for any Oklahoma citizen to
carry or use a firearm under the influence of drugs or alcohol." 9 That
statute also provides that if a person convicted of violating section 1289.9
is also an OSDA licensee, administrative penalties will apply in addition to
the punishment that flows from the misdemeanor charge of carrying or using
a weapon under the influence." ' The extra penalties include an additional
fine and suspension of the OSDA license. 6 ' This section places additional
accountability upon OSDA licensees based on the same level of responsibility expected from all citizens.
The statute that caught the attention of the court in Holt was title 21,
section 1290.8(C)." 2 The terms of that section require a person carrying
a concealed weapon by virtue of an OSDA license to reveal that fact to any
law enforcement officer when the licensee "first comes into contact with [the
officer] during the course of any arrest, detainment, or routine traffic
carrying firearms, which case is wholly or partially visible, in a gun rack
mounted in the vehicle, in an exterior locked compartment or a trunk of a
vehicle.
Id. § 1289.7.
158. Section 1289.7 states:
Any person who is an operator of a vehicle or is a passenger in any vehicle
wherein another person who is licensed . . to carry a concealed handgun and
is carrying a concealed handgun or has concealed the handgun in such vehicle,
shall not be deemed in violation of the provisions of this section provided the
licensee is in or near the vehicle.
Id.
159. The statute reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to carry or use shotguns, rifles or pistols in
any circumstances while under the influence of beer, intoxicating liquors or any
hallucinogenic, or any unlawful or unprescribed drug, and it shall be unlawful
for any person to carry or use shotguns, rifles or pistols when under the
influence of any drug prescribed by a licensed physician if the aftereffects of
such consumption affect mental, emotional or physical processes to a degree
that would result in abnormal behavior.
Id. § 1289.9. Violation of this statute is punished as a misdemeanor. Id. § 1289.15.
160. Id. § 1289.9.
161. Id.
162. United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2001).
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stop."'' 3 Failure to comply is a misdemeanor.'" By its very terms, this
provision applies only to OSDA licensees and not to the general public. It
is part of the heightened responsibility and accountability the state demands
in exchange for the license to carry a concealed weapon. Section 1290.8(C)
applies only to a relatively small portion of Oklahoma citizens. By holding
the entire population to that stricter standard, the Tenth Circuit eliminates
any expectation of privacy for all Oklahoma citizens in the possession of a
concealed weapon.
Further, the requirements of section 1290.8(C) do not apply in all
situations, even for OSDA licensees. In any situation other than an "arrest,
detainment, or routine traffic stop,"" the licensee is not required to
divulge that he is carrying a concealed weapon. If a licensee were to
encounter a police officer walking down the street, he thus would not be
required to reveal that he was carrying a gun unless he were detained or
arrested.'" His possession of the gun would remain private.
The provision of the Oklahoma Statutes that most soundly refutes the
majority's position is found in title 21, section 1290.8(E), which specifically
establishes an expectation of privacy in the possession of a concealed
weapon for OSDA licensees. Section 1290.8(E) states that "[n]othing in [the
OSDA] shall be construed to authorize a law enforcement officer to inspect
any weapon properly concealed without probable cause that a crime has
been committed."'6 7 Although the statute requires the licensee to reveal the
presence of the weapon, the officer must have probable cause before
ordering the licensee to produce the weapon for inspection. Short of that,
the citizen in lawful possession of a handgun expects that possession to
remain private. By the terms of the statute, even a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity is not sufficient to enable the officer to inspect a properly

163. The relevant text provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to fail or refuse to identify the fact that the
person is in actual possession of a concealed handgun pursuant to the authority
of the Oklahoma Self-Defense Act when the person first comes into contact
with any law enforcement officer of this state or its political subdivisions or a
federal law enforcement officer during the course of any arrest, detainment, or
routine traffic stop.
21 OKLA. STAT. § 1290.8(C) (2001).

164. Id. Administrative sanctions also apply. Id.
165. Id.
166. Similarly, the statute would not require a motorist in a car to reveal the presence
of the concealed weapon to the officer when the situation was not an arrest, detainment, or
routine traffic stop. An example of such a situation might be an officer stopping to offer
assistance to a motorist on the road.
167. Id. § 1290.8(E).
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concealed weapon.
The OSDA does not apply to all Oklahomans. The legislature intended
that body of law to remain separate from the rest of the law that applies to
all citizens. Furthermore, it took great pains to structure the statutes so as
to keep the two bodies of law separate. Moreover, the OSDA does not
require licensees to reveal the presence of concealed weapons under all
circumstances. It specifically forbids officers from requiring production of
a weapon without probable cause. All of these factors point to the
conclusion that the OSDA does not remove the reasonable expectation of
privacy that licensees have in the possession of their weapons.
B. The Majority Holding Creates IrreconcilableConflicts with the Fourth
Amendment
Before examining the ramifications of Holt, it is important to recognize
what situations Holt's facts do not present. First, it is not a situation
comparable to that examined in Whren v. United States,'" in which the
Court held that an individual officer's subjective intentions are not relevant
to the Fourth Amendment validity of a traffic stop based on probable
cause.'" The issue in Whren was whether the police had unconstitutionally
seized a car during a traffic stop because their ulterior motive was to search
for drugs.'"' The Supreme Court held that so long as there was probable
cause based on the observed traffic violation, the seizure of the car and
motorist was valid.'
Holt was plainly not wearing his seatbelt.' The trooper was justified
in ordering Holt to pull off the road and writing him a warning citation.
Holt did not protest the validity of the stop.1'7 His contention was that the
trooper impermissibly expanded the scope of the traffic stop investigation
by asking questions about unrelated criminal activity without reasonable
suspicion or probable cause.""
The situation in Holt is also not the situation that the Supreme Court
encountered in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,7 but only because of
unfortunate timing. In Edmond, the Court held that fixed checkpoints that
function only to serve the government's general crime-control interest are

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

517 U.S. 806 (1996).
id. at 813.
Id. at 808.
Id. at 810.
United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1218 n.2.
Id. at 1217.
531 U.S. 32 (2000).
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unconstitutional."' The Supreme Court decided Edmond after the district
court rendered its decision in Holt, and the issue was not adequately
presented to the Tenth Circuit.' Under Edmond, Holt might have argued
that the checkpoint on the road to his house existed solely for the purpose
of stopping him and searching his car for drugs or drug paraphernalia. The
Tenth Circuit stated in Holt that the parties were free to develop more fully
the factual record and address the Edmond issue on remand.'
1. The Court's Holding Eviscerates the Terry Doctrine
The court's ruling in Holt operates as a bright-line exception to the Terry
doctrine." According to Holt, regardless of any particularized suspicion
or lack thereof, and regardless of the reason the motorist was stopped, a
police officer is allowed to ask about weapons in the car."' This exception, based on officer safety, creates sweeping changes in the Terry doctrine.
The court's decision in Holt eliminates the need for particularized
reasonable suspicion. It allows the officer to question the vehicle's occupants
about the presence of guns because of the dangers associated with those
weapons."" But on its face, the court's decision would not allow officers
to question motorists about the presence of other illegal contraband in the
car without reasonable suspicion or probable cause ' - a limitation
founded upon the Terry doctrine.
The problem is this: in Holt, the weapon itself was contraband. A grand
jury indicted Holt on a federal firearms charge." 3 Although the record
does not specifically state as much, it would seem a safe assumption that the
major piece of evidence used to prove that charge's elements was the
weapon itself. The rule announced in Holt allows police officers to engage
176. Id. at 42.

177. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1218 n.2.
178. Id.
179. Id.at 1226.

180. Id.
181. Id. at 1223.

182. Id. at 1226 n.5; see also United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1277 (1lth Cir.
2001) (quoting United States v. Holloman, 113 F.3d 192, 196 (11th Cir. 1997), for the
proposition that a traffic stop must be limited in both scope and duration in that it must not
last 'any longer than necessary to process the traffic violation' unless there is articulable
suspicion of other illegal activity"); United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir.
1999) (stating that an officer may engage in questioning unrelated to the purpose of the
traffic stop only if there is probable cause, consent, or, "at a minimum," reasonable
suspicion); United States v. Turner, 928 F.2d 956, 959 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that when
an officer retains possession of the motorist's driving license, there must be reasonable
suspicion before the officer may ask questions about drugs or weapons).
183. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1219.
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in random, suspicionless criminal investigations because the contraband
sought also happens to be dangerous to the officer.
In United States v. Brown,"u the Seventh Circuit held that although the
confrontation between the citizen and the police officer is fraught with
danger for the officer, that fact alone cannot justify a pat-down of the
citizen. ' The court stated that the case law simply does not support the
proposition that officers may frisk the occupants of any car stopped for a
traffic violation.'" Under Terry principles, "[a]n officer is not justified in
exploratory search for evidence under the guise of a
conducting a general
7
'1
stop-and-frisk."
These statements apply fully in Holt's situation - a verbal pat-down
in which the police interrogate a motorist regarding a criminal matter outside
the scope of the traffic stop. A police officer is not justified in questioning
the occupants of a car about a criminal matter unrelated to the traffic stop
without a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is ongoing or about to
occur.'' Despite the possible presence of danger, the officer simply is not
constitutionally empowered to conduct a general exploratory search under
the guise of the Terry doctrine. 9 The Tenth Circuit turns that doctrine on
its ear in Holt by stating that the possible presence of danger constitutionally
empowers the officer to interrogate the motorist without suspicion.'"
The determination of a traffic stop's Fourth Amendment reasonableness
under the Terry doctrine is a two-part analysis - scope and duration. 9 '
184. 188 F.3d 860 (7th Cir. 1999).
185. Id. at 864; see also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000) ("[T]he
gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions concerning what means law
enforcement officers may employ to pursue a given purpose.").
186. Brown, 188 F.3d at 864; see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 n.5
(1977) (stating that the authority of an officer to order the driver out of a car does not imply
that the officer may frisk the occupants of any car stopped for a traffic violation; the
justification for ordering the driver out arose from an "independent reason to suspect criminal
activity and present danger" and not the mere fact that the driver had committed a traffic
violation).
187. Brown, 188 F.3d at 866.
188. See United States v. Foley, 206 F.3d 802, 806 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating that "an
officer may properly expand the scope of his investigation as reasonable suspicion dictates");
United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1349 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that questions
unrelated to the purpose of the stop are justified only if the officer has reasonable suspicion
or the consent of the person questioned); United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d 1479,
1483 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that an officer may question the driver in a matter unrelated
to the traffic stop only where there is "an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that
illegal activity has occurred or is occurring" or where the driver consents to the questioning).
189. Brown, 188 F.3d at 866.
190. United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1226 (10th Cir. 2001).
191. See United States v. Childs, 256 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v.
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While not going as far as the Fifth Circuit in Shabazz, the Tenth Circuit in
Holt nonetheless managed to circumvent the scope prong of the analysis.
Under Holt, a police officer is always justified in expanding the scope of a
traffic stop to ask about weapons in the car because of the possibility that
they might be present.' The officer, previously limited in her questioning
to matters related to the stop, is now free to interrogate the motorist on a
completely unrelated topic to ensure her own safety. The interrogation need
not be supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion.'" Such a rule
is clearly at odds with precedent concerning the Terry doctrine.
In United States v. Childs,' the Seventh Circuit applied the Terry
doctrine's scope prong to invalidate a police search and seizure of drugs.""
Childs represents the opposing position to the Fifth Circuit in Shabazz. In
Childs, two officers pulled over a motorist for driving with a badly cracked
windshield.' While one officer dealt with the driver, the other asked the
passenger if he had any marijuana in the car.'" The passenger denied
having drugs. 9 The officer asked for consent to search him.'' As the
passenger got out of the car, he placed a partially open cigarette package on
the seat. The cigarette package contained drugs in plain view."" Significantly, that same officer had arrested that same person for drug
possession just three days earlier."'
The Childs court held that the officer's questioning of the passenger,
without reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that the passenger
was committing any offense at that particular time, exceeded the permissible
scope of the traffic stop.20' The court stated that because Terry principles
govern a traffic stop the impermissible questioning resulted in an unconstitutional search and seizure.' While there were some factors present
that an officer could combine with others to generate reasonable suspicion,

Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th
Cir. 1999); United States v. Mendez, 118 F.3d 1426, 1429 (10th Cir. 1997); United States
v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 871 (10th Cir. 1995).
192. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1226.
193. Id.
194. 256 F.3d 559 (7th Cir. 2001).
195. Id. at 564.
196. Id. at 561.
197. Id. at 561-62.
198. Id. at 567.
199. Id. at 562.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 561.

202. Id. at 566.
203. Id. at 564.
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such as nervousness and a known criminal record, the court said that those
two factors standing alone did not justify the police action." The court
also stated that of all the factors that an officer could combine to generate
reasonable suspicion, additional questioning outside the investigative
detention's scope is not one of them. "
In Holt, the Tenth Circuit has once again turned accepted Terry principles
inside-out. Instead of requiring an officer to point to a reasonable,
individualized, articulable suspicion to justify questioning that goes beyond
a traffic stop's scope, the Holt court does away with the suspicion requirement altogether. The court bypasses all the possible arguments
addressing the quality of the officer's suspicion - whether it was
reasonable, individualized, and more than mere hunch - to hold that
suspicion is not an issue at all because of the danger posed by the mere
possibility that a weapon might be in the car. By removing any requirement
of individualized suspicion, the Tenth Circuit has gutted the Terry doctrine
and trampled over the Fourth Amendment.
2. Oklahoma Citizens Have a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in
Possessinga Concealed Handgun
As earlier explored, the Holt court relied on strained and incorrect logic
to conclude that citizens who have a license to carry a concealed handgun
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in that weapon's possession." '
The Tenth Circuit managed to reach this conclusion despite clear statutory
language establishing a privacy expectation based on the more stringent
probable-cause requirement instead of reasonable suspicion. " ' Walking a
little farther down that path, the court went on to say that because those in
lawful possession have no privacy interest, those who are in unlawful
possession likewise have no privacy interest in possessing a concealed
weapon."l This ruling effectively removes every concealed weapon from
the Fourth Amendment's protection. To take the words of the court at their
face value, no Oklahoma citizen is protected against an unreasonable search
and seizure of a concealed handgun because there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in its possession.
The Tenth Circuit's ruling is based on a profoundly dangerous position
that has no logical stopping point. Practically anything can become a
dangerous weapon in the hands of a determined individual. Although the

204. Id. at 565.
205. Id. at 566.
206. United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2001).
207. See 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1290.8(E) (2001).

208. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1222.
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Holt court founded its decision on safety considerations, the fact remains
that the weapon was contraband.'
Weapons are not the only type of
contraband that can be dangerous to police officers. For example, many of
the chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine, standing alone and
especially in combination, are inherently dangerous. These chemicals are
explosive and flammable as well as toxic."" Because the officer is allowed
to ask about the presence of one type of contraband because it is dangerous,
it follows that she should also be able to ask about other types of dangerous
contraband to protect her own safety.
There can be no denying that firearms present especially difficult
problems for police officers during the performance of their duties. But in
its attempt to blanket the police in judicial protection, the Tenth Circuit
leaves average citizens' rights in the cold. As this new rule expands with
successive interpretations, there is a likely possibility that its focus will shift
away from the fact that the contraband is dangerous and towards the fact
that the contraband is illegal. By following the Tenth Circuit's logic in Holt,
one can easily imagine a situation in which American citizens will have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in anything illegal. While some may
believe that such a state of affairs should not alarm those who abide by the
law, it is very dangerous because the law is always changing. Under a broad
interpretation of Holt, the constitutional rights of all citizens, acting lawfully
and unlawfully alike, become directly dependant upon an item's status as
legal or illegal. The legislature, by enacting laws that determine what is

209. Id. at 1232 (Briscoe, J., dissenting). The dissent points out testimony by the
Highway Patrol trooper stating that he was not at all concerned for his own safety or for that
of other officers at the scene. His interest in obtaining the gun was to "make sure it [wa]s
loaded or that there [wa]s a violation" so that he could "issue a citation or take the subject
into custody." Id.
210. See Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802 (34)-(35) (2000)
(providing a comprehensive list of chemical precursors used in the manufacture of illegal
drugs); Tamara B. Maher, Legal Liabilities Faced by Owners of Property Contaminated by
Clandestine Methamphetamine Laboratories: The Oregon Approach, 27 W1LLAMETTE L.

REV. 325, 326 n.10 (1991) (listing over thirty-four chemical substances found in methamphetamine labs, including sodium cyanide, hydrochloric acid, sulfuric acid, chloroform, ethyl
ether, and methanol); Paul Morris, Fouse v. State: The Arkansas Nighttime Search Rule Helping Make Arkansas the Country's Number One Producer of Methamphetamine, 53 ARK.
L. REV. 965, 978 (2000) (listing the dangers associated with the chemicals used in the
methamphetamine manufacturing process, such as fire, explosion, poison gas, and hazardous
waste contamination; discussing the requirement for hazardous material training for meth-lab
cleanup crews); Charles C. Sinnard, Growing Crime: The Rising Use of Fertilizerfor Illegal
Purposes and the Need for Stricter Regulations Concerning Its Sale and Storage, 4 DRAKE

J. AGRIC. L. 505, 507 (1999) (discussing the use of anhydrous ammonia in the methamphetamine manufacturing process).
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legal and not legal, thus would have direct control over constitutional rights.
Such a state of affairs is clearly contrary to the purpose and spirit of the
Fourth Amendment, and, indeed, to the Constitution as a whole.
C. Holt Creates Conflicts with the Fifth Amendment
Berkemer v. McCarty"' established that a person is not "in custody," for
Miranda purposes, during a routine traffic stop, and so police need not give
Miranda warnings for questioning related to the purpose of the stop."'
Holt is clearly distinguishable from Berkemer on its facts. The police in
Berkemer limited the questioning to the offense for which the driver was
pulled over - driving under the influence."' For those questions, the
Supreme Court held that no Miranda warning was required." 4
On the other hand, the situation in Holt involved questioning completely
outside the detention's scope. Police stopped Holt for failure to wear a seat
belt. The questioning concerned illegal weapons possession. Such a
situation implicates the Fifth Amendment even though Holt was not formally
arrested at the time the question was asked.2t The officers detained Holt
inside the trooper's car, unable to leave or terminate the encounter even if
he had tried, and the officers directly questioned Holt on a criminal matter
unrelated to the traffic stop with no reasonable suspicion or probable
cause.2 6 Other facts specific to Holt include that the detainee was at a
police roadblock, surrounded by other officers immediately outside the car
who were there expressly for the purpose of catching him transporting
drugs. " ' Although not the exact type of situation the court designed
Miranda to deter, this was an interrogation in a police-dominated environment, outside the public view, and Holt was not free to terminate the
encounter and leave." ' The purpose of the encounter, and specifically of

211. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
212. Id. at 440.
213. Id. at 423.
214. Id. at 442.
215. United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 2001).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 595 (1990) (quoting Doe v. United
States, 487 U.S. 201, 213 (1988), for the proposition that the privilege against selfincrimination operates "to spare the accused from having to reveal, directly or indirectly, his
knowledge of facts relating him to the offense or from having to share his thoughts and
beliefs with the Government'"); Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 433 ("The purposes of the safeguards
prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects
into confessing, to relieve the 'inherently compelling pressures" generated by the custodial
setting itself, "'which work to undermine the individual's will to resist,"' and as much as
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the questioning, was to get Holt to say that he was doing something illegal.
In other words, its purpose was to induce Holt to make a statement against
himself. The Fifth Amendment is designed to prevent exactly that sort of
activity by law enforcement officials.
D. The Holt Decision Makes the ConstitutionalRights of Citizens Contingent upon the Subjective Belief of the Police
When a police officer asks a stopped motorist if there are weapons in the
car, she is essentially asking the following question: are you presently
committing a crime for which I can arrest you and put you in jail? To this
question, there are four possible answers.
First, if the motorist answers in the affirmative, the police may use the
statement just as any other voluntary statement in a traffic stop.219 Assuming that there is no permit to carry a concealed weapon, the officer now
has probable cause to believe that the motorist is illegally in possession of
a gun. In other words, the motorist has just confessed to a crime and will
probably find himself under arrest.
Second, the motorist is not required to answer the officer's question.22
The concurrence in Holt is emphatic that police may not use a refusal to
answer as the basis for an arrest or a more intrusive search without
reasonable suspicion.' But because the purpose of the officer's question
was the protection of her own safety, the Holt court holds that the motorist's
refusal to answer may alert the officer to the need for additional safety
precautions. 2" In a traffic stop based on Terry principles, such precautions
can include a pat-down search of the driver and passengers as well as a
"frisk" of the surfaces inside the passenger compartment. 2" The effect, if
not the letter, of the court's position is that a refusal to answer is sufficient
vel non to generate reasonable suspicion for Terry-style safety-related
searches.
Third, the motorist can deny possessing a weapon."' Once that occurs,

possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try and determine,
after the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary.") (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430 (1984)); United States v. Gale, 952 F.2d 1412,
1415 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that where officers had reasonable suspicion that person
was in possession of illegal drugs, Miranda warnings were not required before questioning
during an investigative detention).
219. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1224.
220. Id. at 1237 (Henry, J., concurring).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118 (1998).
224. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1224.
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there are two possible results: either (1) the officer will believe the motorist
or (2) she will not. If the officer believes the motorist, then the traffic stop
should proceed as one would expect. The motorist will receive a citation for
the traffic infraction, be told to have a nice day, and be sent on his way.
More problematic is the situation in which the officer does not believe the
motorist's negative response. Under the court's rubric, such disbelief would
heighten the officer's awareness of the need for safety precautions,2"
possibly resulting in reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and
dangerous, and the Terry searches would be available. Hopefully the court
would require the officer to have specific and articulable reasons why she
did not believe the motorist, but even so, the officer would have unrestrained discretion on the side of the road subjectively to believe or
disbelieve and to adjust her conduct accordingly. 6
Courts have repeatedly held that the subjective state of the individual
officer is immaterial in Fourth Amendment analysis."" But the Holt rule
places the officer's subjective belief or disbelief precisely at the collision
point between the government's interest and the citizen's constitutional
rights. The fate of the motorist who denies having a weapon in the car
depends completely upon the belief, disbelief, or whim of the officer on the
side of the road. Such a state of affairs plainly runs afoul of the Fourth
Amendment and the Constitution by making citizens' rights dependent upon
the officer's subjective belief rather than upon the law.
The final possible answer, and the most problematic, is the invocation of
the right to counsel. 2 ' If the motorist refused to answer the question
225. Id.
226. While the Tenth Circuit's holding requires the subjective mindset of the officer to

enter into the decision of what will happen on the side of the road, the court also indicates
that such subjective matters do not play a role in any Fourth Amendment analysis. Id. at
1225. The subjective mindset of the police officer either enters into the analysis or it does
not. The court cannot have it both ways. In an attempt to explain why subjective
considerations should not be relevant to a Fourth Amendment analysis, the court says "'most
police officers . . . would act out of a host of different, instinctive, largely unverifiable
motives - their own safety, the safety of others, and perhaps as well the desire to obtain
incriminating evidence from the suspect."' Id. (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649,
656 (1984)). That statement defines precisely why the Holt decision is constitutionally
flawed: at least at some point, it relies on the subjective belief or disbelief of the officer on
the street with nothing more. The court should not claim on one hand to avoid reliance on
police officers' subjective inclinations in constitutional analysis and then at the same time
hand down a ruling which in fact relies upon such considerations.
227. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38 (1996); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806, 813 (1996); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984); United States v. Murray,
89 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th
Cir. 1995).
228. The court did not consider this option. The Fifth Amendment right to counsel was
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without counsel present, the officer would be placed in a rather interesting
predicament. Such a statement would likely be treated as a refusal to
answer, so the safety-related Terry searches would seem to be in order."'
Yet the motorist did not actually refuse to answer. He has merely delayed
the answer until the arrival of counsel. Does the motorist have a Fifth
Amendment right to counsel during a traffic stop?'" Are the officer and
the motorist going to wait on the side of the road for an attorney to show
up? If so, that would seem to implicate the duration prong of the Terry
traffic-stop analysis. 3 ' Would such a lengthy traffic stop rise to the level
of "custody" for the purposes of Miranda?3 Or should the officer simply
arrest the motorist for the traffic violation233 and search the car incident to
the arrest?2" As demonstrated, the court's decision creates far more
questions than answers.
V. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit's ruling allows the police to accomplish in the name of
officer safety what they ordinarily could not. The court has subverted the
Constitution with an exception that makes constitutional that which is, and
always has been, unconstitutional. This exception slices deep into Supreme
Court Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and it implicates the basic Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. In order to be reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment, police must base the seizure of a person for the
purpose of investigating a criminal matter on reasonable suspicion, as
established as another layer of procedural safeguards in the Miranda warning. As such, the
right likely becomes active only when a suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation, as
defined by Miranda and its progeny. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176-77 (1991);
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981).
229. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118 (1998).
230. See Robinette, 519 U.S. at 38; Whren, 517 U.S. at 813; Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442;
Murray, 89 F.3d at 462; Botero.Ospina, 71 F.3d at 787.

231. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion); United States
v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1176 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th
Cir. 1999); United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1349 (10th Cir. 1998).
232. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125
(1983) (per curiam), in holding that Miranda safeguards come into play when a person's
"freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with formal arrest"); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966) (deciding that a person is in custody when authorities
have deprived him of his freedom in any significant way); United States v. Shabazz, 993
F.2d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 1993) ("A prolonged investigative detention may be tantamount to
a de facto arrest.").
233. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
234. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,460 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
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defined by relevant case law. The decision in Holt, to the extent it allows
police officers to conduct arbitrary criminal investigations with neither
reasonable suspicion nor probable cause, runs counter to the Fourth
Amendment and must not stand. To use the words of U.S. Supreme Court
Justice McReynolds in 1925,
The damnable character of the 'bootlegger's' business should not
close our eyes to the mischief which will surely follow any
attempt to destroy it by unwarranted methods. 'To press forward
to a great principle by breaking through every other great
principle that stands in the way of its establishment;. . . in short,
to procure an eminent good by means that are unlawful, is as
little consonant to private morality as to public justice. "3
1. Michael Hughes

235. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 163 (1925) (McReynolds, J., dissenting)
(quoting Sir William Scott in Le Louis, 2 Dods. 210, 257, 165 Eng. Rep. 1464, 1479 (1817)).
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